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Abstract 
Surrogacy arrangements defy traditional definitions of parenthood and pose challenges in determining who 
should be recognised as legal parents. This is exacerbated by the use of assisted reproductive techniques which 
allow for the separation of genetic, gestational and intentional parenthood, creating questions about the 
comparative value of these contributions.  
This paper identifies that New Zealand legislation dealing with parentage in surrogacy, primarily the Adoption 
Act 1955 and the Status of Children Act 1969, never contemplated surrogacy arrangements and requires strained 
interpretation to avoid perverse results. The paper critiques two proposals for reform: the Law Commission’s 
recommendations in the 2005 New Issues in Legal Parenthood Report, and the framework suggested in the Care 
of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Reform) Amendment Bill.  
This paper concludes that the proposed Amendment Bill shows promise, however should incorporate the Law 
Commission’s 2005 recommendations to provide a truly comprehensive framework. This framework should 
focus on giving effect to the intentions of parties to a surrogacy arrangement, while ensuring the interests of the 
surrogate are protected and the arrangement is carried out in accordance with recognised ethical principles. It is 
additionally important that children have an opportunity to know their genetic and/or biological background. 
 
 
 
Word Count: The text of this paper (excluding cover page, abstract, table of contents, non-substantive 
footnotes, appendix and bibliography) comprises approximately 15,149 words. 
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I Introduction 
Surrogacy arrangements defy traditional definitions of parenthood and pose challenges in 
determining who should be recognised as legal parents. 
The advent of assisted human reproductive technologies has promoted the practice, and 
provoked the question of what it means to be a mother by allowing for the separation of 
genetic and gestational parenthood. In a modern day surrogacy arrangement, a woman may 
gestate a baby to whom she has no genetic tie, and has no intention to raise.  
Yet, the patchwork of legislation in New Zealand governing parentage is still underpinned by 
two fundamental principles: firstly, that the gestational mother will always be the child’s 
legal mother; and secondly, that if the gestational mother has a partner, that partner is the 
other legal parent of the resulting child.  
To give effect to the intention of parties to a surrogacy agreement, adoption is necessary. The 
archaic Adoption Act 1955 never contemplated such arrangements, and requires increasingly 
strained interpretations to avoid perverse results. As a result many social (and often, genetic) 
parents of children conceived through surrogacy arrangements never legally formalise their 
role. As posited by Michael Kirby over two decades ago, “the hare of science and technology 
lurches ahead while the tortoise of the law ambles slowly behind.”
1
  
This paper gives a brief introduction to the development of surrogacy in New Zealand, before 
outlining the current statutes allocating parentage and their awkward application to surrogacy 
arrangements.  
Subsequently, the author identifies and discusses key issues for consideration in developing 
an appropriate legal framework to determine parentage in surrogacy. 
Utilising the conclusions drawn from the latter discussion, the paper critiques two proposals 
for reform: the Law Commission’s recommendations articulated in the 2005 New Issues in 
Legal Parenthood Report,
2
 and the framework suggested in the Care of Children (Adoption 
and Surrogacy Law Reform) Amendment Bill. 
II Scope 
 
                                                            
1
 Michael Kirby “Medical technology and new frontiers of family law” in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed) Legal 
Issues in Human Reproduction (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1989) 3 at 14. 
2 Law Commission New Issues in Legal Parenthood (NZLC R88, 2005) [Legal Parenthood Report] 
 6 
This paper does not comment on the morality of surrogacy. It focuses solely on the law 
allocating legal parentage when children result from such arrangements.
3
  
The Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Ministerial Committee) 
noted in 1994 that there was considerable literature on the surrogacy debate which their 
report could not hope to reflect.
4
 That statement is equally true for this paper.  
Accordingly this paper focuses on determining the appropriate framework within the New 
Zealand landscape. While overseas approaches can be instructive, any New Zealand response 
should be first and foremost “in the light of our own culture and history.”
5
  
This framework focuses on transferring legal parenthood where all parties remain in 
agreement. However, the relevant principles underlying any framework will inform the 
Court’s analysis in approaching determinations of parenthood and day-to-day care should a 
surrogacy arrangement break down. 
III Definitions  
The following terms will be used throughout the paper. The definitions are largely drawn 
from the Law Commission’s New Issues in Legal Parenthood Report. 
A Technologies 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) are procedures designed to assist an individual 
or couple to conceive a child with medical assistance. “Procedures may involve the use of 
donated sperm, eggs, or donated embryo to bring about conception.”
6
 
In vitro fertilisation (IVF) is “[f]ertilisation occurring outside the human body, where eggs 
are fertilised with sperm in a laboratory, usually in a dish or test tube.”
7
 
B Surrogacy 
The Law Commission describes surrogacy as:
8
 
… an agreement between a woman and another person or persons, in which she agrees to 
become pregnant, gestate and give birth to a child and then pass the child to the other person(s) 
to raise from birth as the child’s parents. Surrogacy has developed as a last resort option for 
women who are infertile. 
                                                            
3 This is consistent with Parliament’s approach to legislating on the status of children resulting from donor 
gamete conception, and the Law Commission’s approach in formulating the 2005 Legal Parenthood Report: see 
(30 June 1987) 482 NZPD 10104; and the Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at [2.21]. 
4
 Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies Assisted Human Reproduction: Navigating our 
Future (Reporting to Minister of Justice, July 1994) at 108. 
5
 At 26. 
6
 Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at vii.  
7
 At X. 
8 At [7.1]. 
 7 
In addition to infertile women, surrogacy is “an avenue whereby men in a gay relationship 
can have a primary parenting relationship with a child and one of the men can be the genetic 
father”.
9
  
Surrogacy may be altruistic (unpaid) or commercial (for financial gain).
10
  Commercial 
surrogacy is illegal in New Zealand (see Part V). 
C Parenthood 
Genetic parents are the persons whose eggs or sperm have been used to conceive the child.
11
  
Social parents are the persons who take on responsibility for the upbringing of the child.
12
 
Intending parents are the persons in a surrogacy arrangement who arrange for the surrogate to 
gestate and give birth to a child. The intending parents expect to act as the social parents, and 
may be genetic parents if their gametes were used in conception.
13
 
D Forms of Surrogacy 
A traditional surrogate is a surrogate mother whose own eggs are used to achieve 
conception.
14
 
This paper defines a surrogate mother who is not genetically related to the child she is 
carrying for the intending parents as a gestational surrogate.
15
  
The paper will also refer to private and clinical surrogacy. Private surrogacy takes place 
without the use of clinical assistance. For example, the intending father or a donor may 
provide his semen for use in self-insemination at home.
16
 Conception in private surrogacy can 
also occur through sexual intercourse. Private surrogacies will always be traditional, as the 
ovum donation required in gestational surrogacy is a surgical procedure. 
Clinical surrogacy occurs through the use of ARTs, including ovum donation. Clinical 
surrogacy can be traditional or gestational. 
IV Birth of Controversy 
                                                            
9 At [7.6].  
10
 Law Commission New Issues in Legal Parenthood: A discussion paper (NZLC PP54, 2004) at xvii [Legal 
Parenthood Discussion Paper] 
11
 Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at ix. 
12 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at xv. 
13
 Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at x. 
14
 At xi. 
15
 At ix.  
16 At xi. 
 8 
Traditional surrogacy has its origins in antiquity.
17
 In the Bible, Abraham had a child by his 
servant as his wife was beyond childbearing age.
18
 David Salmon notes:
19
  
…the 18
th
 BC Babylonian legal code of Hammurabi not only recognised the practice of 
surrogacy and described situations in which it would be permissible, but even laid down 
guidelines for protection of the rights of both female parties. 
Accordingly traditional surrogacy is not a modern phenomenon. However, the development 
of IVF, egg donation, and embryo donation to treat infertility is.
20
 The first IVF baby, Louise 
Brown, was born in the United Kingdom in July 1978.
21
 Importantly for the purposes of this 
paper, the procedure enabled gestational surrogacy:
22
 
...[IVF] opened up the possibility that a fertilised embryo could be implanted into the uterus of 
another woman…[a] woman could, for the first time, gestate and give birth to a child to whom 
she had no genetic relationship. 
ARTs and surrogacy became hot topics in the 1980s. Surrogacy in particular caused what 
Michael Freeman has described as a “moral panic”.
23
 Concerns were born from distaste for 
the commodification of women and children, and apprehension that “surrogacy had the 
potential to exploit less economically and occupationally advantaged women by those who 
did not want to go through the inconvenience of pregnancy.”
24
 
New Zealand’s first IVF baby was born in 1984.
25
 No legislation was in place at this time 
governing ARTs. Government policy had been to hold a “watching brief”.
26
 
A Baby M 
In the 1980s a high profile United States surrogacy case put governments on notice regarding 
the difficulties that can arise should a surrogate not wish to part with the resulting child.
27
 
Dianne Yates MP cited the events outlined in the New Jersey case of In re Baby M (Baby M) 
as a motivation for the enactment of New Zealand’s Status of Children Amendment Act 1987 
(see Part V), which related to the legal parentage of children conceived with ARTs.
28
 
                                                            
17
 Douglas Cusine “Legal issues in human reproduction” in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed) Legal Issues in Human 
Reproduction (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1989) 17 at 17. 
18 At 17. 
19
 David Salmon “In response to a freeman: surrogate motherhood and the feminist perspective” (1995) 1 BFLJ 
276 at 276. 
20
 At 17. 
21 Susan Donaldson “Test Tube Baby Louise Brown Turns 35” (25 July 2013) ABC News 
<www.abcnews.go.com>  
22
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [4.8]. 
23
 Michael Freeman “Is surrogacy exploitative?” in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed) Legal Issues in Human 
Reproduction (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1989) 164  at 164. 
24
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [4.50]. 
25
 Ministerial Committee, above n 4, at 1. 
26
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [4.18]. 
27 In re Baby M 537 A 2d 1227, (NJ 1988). 
 9 
In Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead acted as a traditional surrogate for an intending couple, the 
Sterns. Pursuant to a surrogacy contract, Mrs Whitehead was inseminated with the intending 
father’s sperm and subsequently conceived and gave birth.  
Mrs Whitehead did not wish to surrender the baby, and court proceedings were filed to 
enforce the contract. The agreement was upheld at first instance but overturned on appeal. 
The Appellate Court ruled that the contract was “contrary to public policy” and therefore void 
and unenforceable.
29
 The Court cited an existing prohibition on payment in consideration of 
adoption, and the unenforceability of contracts in private placement adoptions. There was no 
reason why the situation should differ for surrogacy.
30
 In fact, the Court stated that payment 
of money to a surrogate was likely “illegal, perhaps criminal and potentially degrading to 
women.”
31
 
The issue was instead treated as a custody dispute to be determined in light of the best 
interests of the child.  The Sterns were given custody on this basis, although Mrs Whitehead 
remained the natural mother and was awarded visitation rights in recognition of this status.
32
 
B Early Parameters 
While the New Zealand legislature declined at this stage to regulate ARTs, the Status of 
Children Amendment Act 1987 (1987 Act) was passed to provide for the status of children 
conceived through the use of ARTs. Prior to the enactment of the 1987 Act, motherhood was 
determined in accordance with the common law presumption of mater semper certa est – the 
woman who gives birth to the child is the legal mother.
33
 It was presumed that fatherhood 
was genetic. The man whose sperm brought about the child’s conception would be the legal 
father.
34
  
The 1987 Act allowed children conceived within a marriage via donor gametes to be deemed 
the legal children of their social parents.
35
 Despite assertions that to pass the legislation 
showed tacit approval of ARTs, others maintained the legislation provided only for the status 
of the resulting children, and that it allowed Parliament to reserve its approach to ARTs 
themselves.
 36
 The 1987 Act is discussed in depth in Part V. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
28
 (23 April 1997) 559 NZPD 1227. 
29 In re Baby M, above n 27, at 411, 422. 
30
 At 422. 
31
 At 411. 
32
 At 411. 
33 The Ampthill Peerage [1977] AC 547 at 577 (HL) as cited in Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, 
at [2.1]. 
34
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [2.1]. 
35
 See Part 2, Status of Children Act 1969. 
36 (2 April 1987) 479 NZPD 8271, 8273. 
 10 
The 1987 Act proactively contemplated the practice of egg donation,
37
 which became 
available in New Zealand from 1992.
38
 Accordingly, gestational surrogacy became possible. 
1 INECART 
In 1993, the Government established an Interim National Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (INECART).
39
 ART service providers would submit protocols 
for the ethics body for a decision on whether they were appropriate.
40
 In 1994, INECART 
declined an application for IVF altruistic surrogacy.
41
 This decision was criticised by the 
Ministerial Committee,
42
 the first non-government inquiry into ART in New Zealand.
 43
 
2 NECAHR 
In 1995, INECART was replaced by the National Ethics Committee on Assisted Human 
Reproduction (NECAHR). NECAHR gave ethics approval for ART procedures on a case-by-
case basis.
44
 
In 1997, ethical approval for altruistic IVF surrogacy was given. Draft guidelines were issued 
indicating when NECAHR would be prepared to approve applications.
45
 NECAHR never 
authorised a commercial surrogacy arrangement.
46
  
V Change Overdue 
This section will provide an in-depth look at the legislation currently in force impacting upon 
surrogacy arrangements. This includes both the legislation governing the practice itself, and 
that which defines the legal parent-child relationship. 
A HART Act 2004 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART Act) was an amalgamation 
of two substantively similar ART bills – the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 
introduced by Dianne Yates MP in 1996, and the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill, 
introduced by the government in 1998. An extensive supplementary order paper introduced in 
                                                            
37
 (30 June 1987) 482 NZPD 10104. 
38
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [3.4]. 
39 At [4.19]. 
40
 Ministerial Committee, above n 4, at 3. 
41
 Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin, Family Law Policy in New Zealand (4
th
 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2013) at 
278.  
42 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [4.19] 
43
 Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 255-256. 
44
 At [4.20] 
45
 At [4.20] 
46 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill (2004) (195-2) (select committee report) at 12. 
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April 2003 by David Benson-Pope MP also constituted a central element of the eventual 
Act’s design.
47
 
The Act sets up a three tiered model of regulation for ARTs.
 48
  The first tier entirely prohibits 
a number of controversial procedures, for example human cloning.
49
 
The remaining tiers required the creation of an Advisory Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (ACART),
50
 and an Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (ECART).
51
  
ACART has the power to declare particular ART procedures established procedures.
52
 These 
second tier procedures may be undertaken by fertility clinics without case-by-case ethical 
approval. Current established procedures include most instances of gamete donation, and 
IVF. 
A third tier of non-established procedures must be considered by ECART on a case by case 
basis.
53
 ACART issues guidelines and provides advice to ECART on these procedures. 
ECART subsequently determines and monitors applications for ARTs in accordance with 
these guidelines.
54
 Surrogacy arrangements fall within this third tier.
55
 
1 Relevant provisions 
(a) Section 4: principles 
These principles guide all persons exercising powers or performing functions under the 
HART Act, including ACART and ECART.
56
  
Principle (a) states that:
57
  
The health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of an assisted 
reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an important consideration in all 
decisions about that procedure. 
                                                            
47 At 1. 
48
 Dr Lynley Anderson, Jeanne Snelling and Huia Tomlins-Jahnke “The practice of surrogacy in New Zealand” 
(2012) 52 Aust N Z J Obstet Gynaecol 253 at 253. This model has additionally been referred to as “four tiered”. 
The fourth tier consists of a provision allowing a moratorium to be imposed on a procedure for up to 18 months 
to allow time for the development of guidelines: Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 258-
259. 
49
 See Part 2, Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004: Prohibited and regulated activities. 
50
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 32. 
51 Section 27. 
52
 Section 6; Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 258. 
53
 At 258; Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 28. 
54
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 35. 
55 Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 258. 
56
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 4; ACART Guidelines on Surrogacy Arrangements 
involving Providers of Fertility Services (Guidelines issued to ECART under section 35 of the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004, November 2008) at 2. 
57 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 4(a). 
 12 
The above wording is in contrast to the majority of family law legislation dealing with child 
welfare, in which the child’s best interests as paramount.
58
 The language of paramountcy was 
originally used, but diluted throughout the legislative process.
59
  
This was in part because ARTs were considered to be inherently riskier than natural 
conception. Parliament was wary that this inherent risk could be used to veto any prospective 
ART procedure.
 60
 
Additionally, paramountcy was avoided as requiring a child’s best interests to be treated as 
superior to all others could prevent the appropriate balancing of other significant factors. In 
relation to surrogacy for example, it will be important to ensure the surrogate is protected.
61
 
On that note; principle (c) finds:
62
 
… [that] women, more than men, are directly and significantly affected by [the application of 
ARTs], and the health and wellbeing of women must be protected in the use of these 
procedures.  
Principle (e) holds that “donor offspring should be made aware of their genetic origins and be 
able to access information about these origins.”
63
 
This principle reflects the obligations committed to by New Zealand under the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), notably: a child’s right from 
birth to know their parents; the right to preserve their identity; and the right to seek and 
receive information of all kinds.
64
 
The Act accordingly sets up a comprehensive registry whereby children resulting from donor 
gamete conception can locate genetic and identifying information about their donor parents.
65
  
Inevitably clinical surrogacy will involve gamete donation. Usually access to genetic 
information in clinical donor gamete conception is necessary as the resulting child will not 
have been raised by the genetic donor parent. Surrogacy is unique in that it is possible that the 
social parents of the child are also both genetic parents, but the child does not know the 
gestational parent. There is no registry for surrogate mothers. For further discussion of 
identity in surrogacy, see Part VI. 
                                                            
58
 See the Care of Children Act 2004, s 4; Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, s 6. 
59
 Bill Atkin “Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction: The Recent New Zealand Model in Comparison 
with Other Systems” (2005) 11 RJP/NZACL 81 at 85. 
60
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill (195-2) (select committee report) at 5. 
61
 Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at [1.19]. 
62
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 4(c). 
63 S 4(e). 
64
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), arts 7.1, 8.1, 13.1, as cited in Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, 
above n 10, at [5.13] 
65 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, Part 3. 
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Principle (f) provides that “the needs, values and beliefs of Maori should be considered and 
treated with respect”.
66
 
This principle played a significant part in developing the “ethos of openness” in regards to 
genetic information promoted by the Act;
67
 as knowledge of genealogical origins is of 
particular importance in tikanga Maori.
68
 
(b) Section 14 
Section 14 provides that although a surrogacy arrangement is not of itself illegal, it cannot be 
enforceable against any person. 
Section 14(3) prohibits commercial surrogacy arrangements; holding that it will be an offence 
to give or receive valuable consideration in exchange for participation in a surrogacy 
arrangement.  
Section 14(3) does not apply to payments to fertility providers for reasonable and necessary 
expenses, for example medical or legal expenses incurred.
69
 
2 ACART guidelines and practice 
(a) Guidelines 
Clinical surrogacy is considered a non-established procedure, and requires ethical review. 
Private surrogacy will not be directed through a clinic, and therefore will not be subject to the 
ECART process.
70
 
ECART must review each case in accordance with the ACART Guidelines on Surrogacy 
Arrangements involving Providers of Fertility Services. The guidelines require that ECART, 
in considering applications, be guided by the principles of the HART Act 2004.
71
  
Principal requirements include that at least one of the intending parents will be a genetic 
parent of any resulting child, and that the intending mother has a medical condition 
preventing pregnancy or causing pregnancy to be potentially harmful, or a medical diagnosis 
of unexplained infertility that has not responded to other treatments.
72
 
                                                            
66
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, s 4(f). 
67
 (6 October 2004) 620 NZPD 15900. 
68 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [1.11] 
69
 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, s 14(3). 
70
 Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 277. 
71
 ACART Guidelines, above n 56, at 2. 
72 There is very little research available on what might constitute a “medical condition”: Dr Lynley Anderson 
and Professor Mark Henaghan “Surrogacy and s2(a)(ii): Interpreting the “medical condition” requirement in 
ACART’s Guidelines on Surrogacy Arrangements involving Providers of Fertility Services: How “Medical” is 
“Medical”?: The ethical and legal implications of the “medical condition” requirement in an intending mother’s 
application of surrogacy” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 130 at 130. 
 14 
The guidelines require that discussions about the intended day-to-day care, guardianship, or 
adoption of a resulting child have occurred. Independent medical and legal advice is required, 
as well as counselling for all parties involved.
73
 
The relevant factors to be taken into account by ECART in each case include whether the 
intending surrogate has completed her family; whether the relationship between the surrogate 
and the intending parents safeguards the wellbeing of all parties, especially any resulting 
child; whether legal reports indicate the parties clearly understand the legal issues involved; 
the value of any counselling that has occurred, as well as the on-going availability of 
counselling; and whether the residency of the parties safeguards the wellbeing of all parties, 
especially any resulting child.
74
 
(b) Social infertility 
The guidelines focus on medical diagnoses, and exclude social infertility.
75
 Social infertility 
encompasses those who have no medical impediment, but are unable to have children for 
social reasons – for example a single person, or a same-sex couple.
76
  
Women who are socially infertile can normally achieve the desired outcome with gamete 
donation. However gamete donation cannot provide a solution for homosexual and single 
males who wish to have a genetically related child. These men will not meet ACART’s 
current criteria. The infertility requirement cannot be stretched so far as to suggest that being 
male is a medical condition.
77
  
ACART have agreed that this provision constitutes unjustified discrimination, and that the 
medical criteria must change.
78
 Consultation began on this point in 2012,
79
 and accordingly 
the author presumes that single and homosexual males will be eligible for ECART approval 
in the near future. Therefore when considering the appropriate framework for parentage, it is 
important to include mechanisms for the transferral of parentage to male intending couples 
(and singles). This is exacerbated by evidence male couples are resorting to international 
surrogacy to attain genetic children, and seeking to have their parenthood recognised under 
New Zealand law upon their return.
80
 
(c) Practice 
                                                            
73
 ACART Guidelines, above n 56, at 3. 
74
 At 3. 
75 Anderson and Henaghan, “Surrogacy and s 2(a)(ii)”, above n 72,at 130. 
76
 Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 252. 
77
 Debbie Dunbar “Surrogacy for same sex male couples” (21 March 2013) Rainey Collins Lawyers 
<www.raineycollins.co.nz>  
78Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology: Annual Report 2011/2012 (ACART, November 
2012) at 4. 
79
 At 4. 
80
 See: Re an application by BWS to adopt a child [2011] NZFLR 621; Rachel Morton “Couple’s kids denied 
citizenship over surrogacy” (15 September 2013) 3 News <www.3news.co.nz> 
 15 
The ACART guidelines are robust requirements, yet practice shows that most applications 
are approved.
81
 Between 2004 and 2011, NECAHR and ECART received 111 surrogacy 
applications, 102 of which were approved.
82
  
B Status of Children Act 1969 
The Status of Children Act 1969 governs legal parenthood in New Zealand. Originally 
enacted to dispose of the concept of “illegitimacy” for children born outside a marriage,
83
 the 
Act was amended in 1987 to remove uncertainty about the status of children conceived 
through ARTs. The Status of Children Amendment Act 2004 (2004 Act) replaced the 1987 
Act, continuing the effect of the latter Act while introducing a small number of 
amendments.
84
 
1 Legal parenthood 
Legal parenthood, among other things, determines a child’s citizenship, inheritance rights, 
and provides rights to child support should parental relationships break down.
85
 Typically 
parenthood will entail the automatic bestowal of guardianship.
86
  
Guardianship will usually enable the exercise of day-to-day care of the child, in addition to 
the ability to make decisions about important matters such as healthcare or schooling.
87
  
2 Natural conception 
Historically, parenthood has been grounded in genetic connection. Absent genetic 
connection, hopeful parents to be are screened by the state to determine their suitability.
88
  
When children are conceived naturally, maternity can be conclusively demonstrated with 
evidence of birth giving.
89
 However, prior to advances in modern technology it was difficult 
to determine genetic fatherhood. “A presumption exists where conclusive proof is not readily 
available”.
90
 Accordingly, a child born to a woman during her marriage was presumed to be 
                                                            
81
 Dr Lynley Anderson “The practice of surrogacy”, above n 48, at 253.  
82
 Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 279. 
83
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [5.12] 
84 In relation to ART, the 2004 Act replaced the term “married” with the new societal norm “partnered”, which 
significantly, is gender neutral and would allow a female non-donor partner to be deemed the legal parent. 
Additionally the Act directed that non-partner donors would never be considered for any purposes the parent of 
any child resulting from the pregnancy, abolishing the notion that if a single or lesbian woman conceived as a 
result of sperm donation, the donor would be a “shell father” – recognised on the birth certificate, but without 
any rights or liabilities in relation to the child. See Henaghan and Atkin, Family Law Policy, above n 41, at 47; 
and Status of Children Amendment Act 2004. 
85
 Legal Parenthood Report, above n 2, at [1.2]. 
86 At [1.1]. 
87
 At [1.2]. 
88
 At [3.18]. 
89
 At [4.49]. 
90 At [4.49]. 
 16 
the genetic child of her husband.
 91
 Prior to 1969 this presumption also ensured that children 
within a marriage did not suffer the adverse legal consequences of illegitimacy.
92
  
Although it has become easier to determine genetic fatherhood, it is impractical to expect 
genetic testing be undertaken in every instance. Often the father can be easily ascertained due 
to a relationship with the mother of the child. Therefore the paternity presumption is retained 
in s 5 of the Status of Children Act, providing that a child born to a woman during her 
marriage, shall in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be the child of the 
mother and her husband. 
If the parents of a child are not married, the most typical means of recognising paternity in 
law is a joint acknowledgement of paternity.
93
 Acknowledgement can occur through joint 
signatures on an instrument executed as a deed, or naming the father on the birth certificate.
94
 
3 Parenthood and ART 
“Prior to the 1987 Amendment Act… a gamete donor was still, in law, a parent to the child 
with full legal liabilities and rights.”
95
 This affected not only the “integrity of the [recipient] 
family unit” but also the donors, who did not intend to assume parental liabilities.
96
 One 
adverse result was that donors were less open about their identity due to fear of incurring 
liability for the child.
97
  
The 1987 Act’s (and subsequently, the 2004 Act’s) philosophy was that parentage “should be 
decided on a social rather than a biological basis.”
98
 This recognised that gamete donors 
generally “do not want the rights, duties and liabilities of parenthood, whereas the recipients 
of donation do.”
99
  
Accordingly, the Status of Children Act provides that where ARTs are used parental status is 
transferred from the donor to the mother and her partner automatically. Donors lose any 
rights and responsibilities towards the child.
100
 This includes scenarios in which single 
women are the recipients of sperm donation.
101
 
The status of children conceived as a result of ART procedures is set out in Part 2 of the Act.  
 (a) Maternity 
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If a woman conceives with donor gametes, she is for all purposes the mother of the child.
102
  
 (b) Consenting partner 
Section 18 determines that, if the woman who falls pregnant as a result of an ART procedure 
has a non-donor partner who has consented to the procedure, that partner is for all purposes 
the parent of the child and the donor is deemed not to be a parent.  
Section 26 deals with scenarios of conflicting evidence of paternity, holding that the sections 
which relieve the genetic donors of their legal rights and liabilities in relation to the child will 
trump any conflicting evidence that the man who produced the semen was the father of the 
child of the pregnancy.  
4 Identity 
While the above provisions provide the social parent with automatic status in relation to the 
child, they create a legal fiction in that the recipient parents are held out in law to be the 
child’s genetic parents.
103
 
Unlike adoption, in which the genetic parents are initially named but then removed, genetic 
donors are never named on the birth certificate. Instead, the HART Act 2004 requires that 
information about the donor is included in a donor registry. Access by the resulting child to 
the donor registry and accordingly, information about the donor relies on the parents 
informing the child about the circumstances of their conception.
104
  
5 Application to surrogacy 
The Act itself does not specifically provide for surrogacy.
105
 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer (then Minister of Justice) supposedly promoted the 1987 Act in part to 
prevent a Baby M case in New Zealand, by establishing the rights of a legal birth mother.
106
 If 
this is accepted, it can be inferred from the inclusion of the maternity rule that Parliament 
intended the gestational mother to be the legal mother of any child born pursuant to a 
surrogacy arrangement. 
Regardless, as generally surrogacy will involve the use of ARTs, surrogacy arrangements will 
come under the deeming rules applicable to donor gamete conception. The exception is a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement achieved by sexual intercourse, which does not require 
ARTs and accordingly would not fall under Part 2 of the Act.  
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Where ARTs are utilised, the rules designed for gamete donation produce consequences 
almost exactly opposite to the intent of parties to a surrogacy arrangement.
107
 
The surrogate is the legal mother of any resulting child. This position is unchanged even if 
she is a gestational surrogate who conceived with the ovum of the intending mother or an egg 
donor. The surrogate subsequently bears all the legal rights and liabilities of motherhood 
“unless and until the child becomes adopted.”
108
 
(a) Psychological commitment 
Part 2 of the Status of Children Act intends for parenthood to be based on “the psychological 
commitment of the social parents rather than on a biological blood-line”,
109
 but fails to do so 
in regard to surrogacy arrangements.  
The preference to vest legal motherhood in the gestational parent can be attributed to a desire 
to protect the interests of the surrogate. The New Zealand legislature has consistently 
expressed concern about the relationship between surrogacy arrangements and the 
exploitation of women, recognising the emotional difficulty in requiring that a child which 
has been gestated for nine months be relinquished.
110
  
This provision is consistent with the policy not to allow the enforceability of a surrogacy 
arrangement by the courts, signalling Parliament was not prepared to allow the transfer of 
parental status through contractual agreement. 
While a mechanism to protect the autonomy of the surrogate is important, the current status 
quo of determining the surrogate the legal mother until and if an adoption is carried out may 
negate the intention of the surrogate herself. Similarly to gamete donors, a surrogate 
generally has no desire to raise the child and accordingly no wish to attract rights and 
responsibilities to the child. Allowing a mechanism whereby the surrogate, who never 
intended to parent the child, could easily divest herself of legal parenthood in favour of the 
intending parents could in fact promote her autonomy. 
 (b) Surrogate’s partner and legal parenthood 
If the surrogate’s partner has approved of and agreed to the process, they will be deemed the 
additional legal parent under section 18. The deeming provision will prevail despite any 
contradictory evidence that an intending parent has a genetic link to the child.
111
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In Re Application by ALH, the intending couple in a surrogacy arrangement applied for an 
adoption order.
112
 The child in question was conceived in a private, traditional surrogacy 
arrangement in which the intending father had provided his sperm with which the surrogate 
was inseminated. The surrogate’s husband gave his blessing to the arrangement. This consent 
saw him deemed the child’s legal father by section 18. 
Nonetheless, the surrogate placed her own name and that of the intending, genetic father on 
the child’s birth certificate. The Family Court ordered that the intending father could not 
appear on the certificate until an adoption order was made. The case clarified that the 
intending father could not be the father in law, as:
113
 
 …a presumption can only be displaced where the surrogate’s husband is presumed to be the 
legal father (as under s 5). Where the surrogate’s husband is deemed to be the father under Part 
2 of the Act…the intending father needs to adopt the child to become a legal parent. Section 26 
makes it clear that the provision in s 18, not s 5, has overriding effect. 
A prospective intending father noted on his blog that he considered the overriding deeming 
provision to be a significant downside of the current regime:
114
 
Our [surrogate] was married, so, for the purposes of a birth certificate, the law would only 
recognise her husband as the legal father of my child. If I had wanted to become legally 
recognised as the father of this child…I would have had to go through an adoption process with 
my wife. To me this was a level of complexity and legal nonsense that I just could not get my 
head around. 
C Adoption Act 1955 
1 Features  
The Adoption Act 1955 operates as a statutory guillotine,
115
 removing the birth parent’s legal 
status (and consequently all responsibility for the child’s upbringing) and deeming substitute 
parents to be the child’s legal parents.
116
 The consent of the birth mother must be obtained, 
absent abandonment or neglect.
117
 In New Zealand, a birth mother is not legally able to give 
consent until at least 10 days after the birth of the child.
118
  
Prospective adoptive parents are vetted by Child, Youth and Family (CYFS). An order may 
only be made if the court is satisfied that the adoptive parents are fit and proper persons to 
                                                            
112
 Re Application by ALH FC North Shore FAM-2011-044-371, 11 August 2011.  
113
 At [16]. 
114
 “What about me or is that far too selfish?” (27 May 2010) How Green is My Grass? <www.djpnz.com>  
115 Law Commission Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New Framework (NZLC R65, 
2004) at [29]. 
116
 Legal Parenthood Discussion Paper, above n 10, at [1.3] 
117
 Adoption Act 1955, ss 7 – 8 
118 Law Commission Adoption, above n 115, at [36]; Adoption Act 1955, s 7(7) 
 20 
raise the child and that the welfare and interests of the child will be promoted by the 
adoption.
119
  
The Adoption Act only permits single persons, and spouses jointly, to adopt.
120
  
Adoption transfers legal parenthood in two stages:
121
 
…custody can be transferred in an interim order made by the court…and six months after the 
interim order is granted, the prospective parents may then apply to the court for a final adoption 
order. 
While this is the usual position, the court has previously been inclined to issue a final 
adoption order immediately where the adopting parents were the full genetic parents of the 
child born to a surrogate.
122
 
Upon adoption, the child’s birth certificate is altered by removing any reference to the birth 
parents, and listing the adoptive parents as the child’s genetic and legal parents, suppressing 
the facts of their relationship and creating a legal fiction.
123
 
2 Critique 
The requirement that the surrogate will be the legal mother (and that any existing partner will 
be deemed a legal parent) until adoption occurs is onerous given the widespread criticism of 
the Adoption Act and its awkward application to surrogacy arrangements.  
Professor Mark Henaghan has stated that “The Adoption Act…was passed at a time when 
some Family Court Judges were not even twinkles in their parents’ eyes and the others were 
running around in nappies.”
124
 Rampant social changes have since occurred. For example, the 
Act only provides for single persons or spouses to adopt, despite the prevalence of de facto 
relationships in modern society. 
(a) Purpose 
Adoption was originally developed to deal with scenarios where children could not be looked 
after by their genetic parents.
125
 
The Law Commission detailed in its 2000 report Adoption and its Alternatives that adoption 
has moved on, and now serves a variety of purposes beyond providing substitute parents 
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when genetic parents are unwilling or unable to raise a child.
126
 Judge von Dadelszen 
elaborated on this point in relation to surrogacy in 2011 case I A M:
127
  
…the Act needs to be interpreted in the light of the social climate and society’s expectations in 
the second decade of the 21
st
 century…[otherwise] no adoption would be granted where 
surrogacy, for example, led to birth and subsequent application. 
(b) Closed adoptions 
In 1955, children born outside of wedlock suffered negative legal and social consequences. 
Once adopted into a marriage their genetic heritage was suppressed and it was presupposed 
that their genetic parents would not be known to them.
128
  
This culture of secrecy was discovered to have negative consequences for adopted children, 
who had no way of knowing their genetic origins.
129
 Public consciousness of this harm led to 
a dramatic change in adoption practice.
130
 Children are now more likely to be adopted 
openly.
131
 In 1985, the Adult Adoption Information Act was enacted and provides a process 
whereby birth parents and adopted children could locate one another.
132
 
This change in practice has never been given effect in the Adoption Act.
133
 The statutory 
guillotine continues, “effecting the complete severance of ties between birth parents and 
children…”
134
 
The closed approach also makes little sense in the context of surrogacy. The Law 
Commission has submitted that, as surrogacy arrangements are unenforceable and as such 
rely on a strong relationship to function, a personal relationship is likely to continue between 
the surrogate and the intending parents after the child is born. This is especially likely if the 
surrogate is a relative or a friend of the intending couple.
135
 
3 Adoption in surrogacy arrangements 
The Adoption Act is therefore highly problematic, and not an adequate mechanism through 
which to funnel surrogacy arrangements.  
This is exacerbated by the difficulties in applying specific sections, ss 6 and 25, to surrogacy. 
(a) Section 6 
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Section 6 provides that it is unlawful to have a child in your home with a view to adoption 
without prior approval of CYFS.  Intending parents in surrogacy arrangements may breach 
this section, as there may be an expectation they begin to care of the child gestated “for them” 
immediately after birth.
136
 
In at least one New Zealand case, the intending parents were not aware of the section 6 
requirement of which they were in breach. CYFS accordingly opposed the adoption order.
137
 
(b) Section 25 
Although s 14 of the HART Act 2004 prohibits commercial surrogacy, altruistic surrogates 
may be reimbursed for reasonable medical or legal expenses incurred. This sits 
uncomfortably with s 25 of the Adoption Act, which prohibits payments in consideration for 
adoption.
138
  
Accordingly, to provide for the status of children born from surrogacy, the courts have been 
required to take an “ambulatory approach to the legislation and interpret its provisions in a 
modern context”.
139
 Even where ss 6 and/or 25 have been breached, an adoption order will be 
granted provided the intending parents are suitable and the adoption is in the welfare and best 
interests of the child.
140
 Although breaches of these sections constitute an offence against s 27 
of the Act, a court will be unlikely to take any action to punish offenders where an adoption 
has been approved; “as convicting the adopters would hardly seem to be in the child’s best 
interests”.
141
  
The approach taken by the New Zealand courts to the above sections is illustrated in the 2012 
judgment Re an application to adopt a child by SCR and MCR (Re SCR). 
142
 
(c) Re SCR 
Re SCR involved a couple who had entered into a commercial surrogacy arrangement 
(legally) in California. While s 6 was originally complied with, the approval expired before 
an adoption application was filed with the Family Court. Judge Walsh considered the relevant 
issue to be whether the breach reflected adversely on the applicants’ status as fit and proper 
persons. As the nature of the breach was merely “technical”, it did not.
 143
   
Due to the commercial nature of the surrogacy, the intending parents also appeared to 
contravene s 25 of the Adoption Act, which prohibits payments in consideration of adoption. 
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Judge Walsh found that when determining whether s 25 applied, the Court must have regard 
to the welfare and best interests of the child.
144
 His Honour also considered that s 25 applied 
only to commercial transactions involving an element of financial profit for a surrogate 
parent, excluding altruistic arrangements in which the surrogate did not profit but was merely 
reimbursed.
145
 
In this case, although the arrangement involved financial profit, the Court noted that the 
intending couple themselves had only paid for the IVF medical fees, medical assurance and 
travel and accommodation. Any commercial fees paid to the surrogate were paid by the 
American paternal grandfather who was not a New Zealand citizen and therefore could not be 
subject to s 25.
146
 One might question whether the structuring of the payment should allow 
the parents to circumvent the section. Regardless, the Court considered any payment that was 
made to the surrogate was consideration for surrogacy and not adoption specifically.
147
 
The above reasoning was underscored by the Court’s consideration of whether the placement 
of the child with the parents would be the child’s welfare and best interests. The Court 
determined a decision to refuse the application would mean the child would become liable for 
deportation upon the expiry of her visitor’s visa, an outcome “repugnant” to her best 
interests.
148
  
(d) Analysis 
The above case demonstrates the willingness of the New Zealand courts to find ways around 
the seemingly plain wording of ss 6 and 25 to allow intending parents to adopt children born 
of surrogacy. 
This is particularly problematic in relation to s 25. As argued by Craig Rotherham: 
149
 
Regardless of how unfair comparisons of surrogacy with baby selling may be, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that, in cases where payments are made by intending parents who intend 
to adopt subsequently, at least part of the payment is made in consideration of the adoption. 
When ECART approves an application for clinical surrogacy, it is the body’s expectation that 
any children born as a result will be adopted in order to protect the interests of all parties 
involved.
150
 Therefore instances where thought was never given to adoption will be rare.
151
 
There has also been scepticism that the aim of the section is to ensure the suitability of the 
adoptive parents as opposed to a broader section against the commodification of children.
152
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In relation to international commercial arrangements, as in Re SCR, to argue that any 
payment is for the surrogacy and not the baby is “specious”.
153
 Wilentz CJ in the landmark 
Baby M case went so far as to state that:
154
 
It strains credulity to claim that these arrangements…really amount to anything other than a 
private placement adoption for money. 
While New Zealand’s judiciary have been using all of the tools at their disposal to interpret 
the law into the 21
st
 century, it is untenable to continue to rely on reasoning extending the 
provision so far beyond the statutory wording, however well-intentioned. This could be 
avoided by the implementation of a clear mechanism allowing the transferral of parental 
rights in surrogacy separate from the scheme of the Adoption Act.  
(e) Effects 
As a result of the numerous difficulties with adoption in surrogacy, resulting children are 
often cared for informally “without the protections a legal parent can provide.”
155
 
A common scenario is for the surrogate to enter her own name and the intending father’s 
name on the birth certificate, without taking further steps in relation to the child’s legal 
status.
156
 As illustrated in Re Application by ALH, this action may be unlawful if the 
surrogate has a partner deemed to be the child’s legal parent.  
An adoption application could proceed under the guise of a step-parent adoption, with the 
fact the child arose from a surrogacy arrangement not disclosed to the court.
157
 
A surrogacy arrangement can also be hidden if the surrogate registers the names of the 
intending parents on the child’s birth certificate, having previously registered herself with her 
doctor, midwife, or hospital in the name of the intending mother. While clearly unlawful, 
there is anecdotal evidence this has happened.
158
 
Some parents struggle with the title of adoption and the associated connotations of having 
assumed parentage of a child from the “real” or biological parents. Intending parents with a 
genetic link may already view the child as theirs. For example, the Law Commission 
interviewed “Mr A”, who conveyed that he had not taken any steps to secure a legal 
relationship with his child as he considered it “wrong that he should have to adopt his own 
child to become a legal father”.
159
 This view is similar to that of the potential intending father 
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in his blog post cited earlier, who added that “[t]he very thought of having to adopt my own 
child, selfishly perhaps, filled me with utter revulsion.”
160
 
In all of the above scenarios, either deception has taken place or a parent has settled for less 
than full legal parenthood. A lack of legal authority is concerning as “children are best 
supported where their social caregivers have the legal rights and responsibilities to act as 
effective parents.”
161
 Without these legal rights: parents are unable to legally consent to 
medical treatment on their child’s behalf; enrol them in school; apply for a passport; or 
ensure the child is entitled to succession benefits.
162
  
This decision also has legal consequences for the surrogate. One surrogate interviewed by the 
Law Commission expressed concern at the legal implications of her on-going status as the 
child’s legal parent. 
163
  
The Law Commission’s New Issues in Legal Parenthood Report concludes in regard to the 
Adoption Act and surrogacy:
164
 
The current adoption model is inappropriate for surrogacy arrangements where one or both of 
the intending parents are genetic parents of the child; it requires screening of all applicant 
parents regardless of genetic affinity; it comes into effect only after the child is born; it makes it 
difficult for the intending parents to care for the newborn child in the two weeks post-birth; and 
it prohibits the passing of money between birth and adoptive parents. 
E International Surrogacy 
Stephen Franks MP argued in response to prohibition on commercial surrogacy included in 
the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill that:
165
 
New Zealanders will do it. They will go to the United States, China, or some Pacific Island 
country – somewhere where someone will carry a child for them – and they will pay the women 
handsomely. 
This statement turned out to be prophetic. As only altruistic surrogacy is permitted in New 
Zealand, it can be difficult to find a woman to act as a surrogate, especially if the intending 
parents have no prior relationship with her.
166
 In 2011 CYFs had 63 inquiries from people 
looking to go overseas to engage in surrogacy as a last resort.
167
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A child born outside of New Zealand pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement, due to the 
operation of the Status of Children Act, is not eligible to claim New Zealand citizenship by 
descent through an intending parent. Consequently, that child generally cannot hold a New 
Zealand passport or reside locally until a permanent legal parent-child relationship is 
established through adoption.
168
 The child is normally brought into the country on a 
temporary visa whilst the adoption takes place.
169
 
The adoption requirement is especially frustrating considering some favoured destinations of 
New Zealand parents engaging in surrogacy, for example California, recognise the intending 
parents as the legal parents.
170
 In September 2013, 3 News reported the story of Rees Rear 
and Brett Ramsey, a Kiwi couple living in Australia who conceived their three children with 
a surrogate in the United States. Although the men are listed on the children’s birth 
certificates, under New Zealand law the surrogate and her partner are the legal parents. To 
achieve citizenship by descent for their children, they would be required to adopt. This 
absurdity is summed up well in Rear’s words, “on their birth certificates we are the parents, 
so we don’t know how we could possibly adopt from ourselves.”
171
 
1 Adoption (Intercountry) Act 1997 
New Zealand is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-
Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the Hague Convention).
172
 The Adoption 
(Intercountry) Act 1997 (1997 Act) purports to implement the Hague Convention.
173
 
The aim of the Hague Convention and 1997 Act is to establish safeguards for intercountry 
adoptions.
174
 The Hague Convention will be engaged if adoptive parents habitually resident 
in New Zealand seek to adopt a child habitually resident in another State party to the 
Convention. The child may only be adopted in New Zealand if the adoption complies with 
the Hague Convention.
175
  
There was a question that if the state in which an intending party engages in international 
surrogacy is party to the Hague Convention, and that parent then seeks to adopt, the 1997 Act 
requirements could be engaged in relation to the surrogacy. Among other things, the 
Convention requires that consent to an adoption cannot be induced by payment or 
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compensation of any kind.
176
 However, recent decisions evidence that the New Zealand 
courts have been willing to treat the “habitual residence” of a child born of surrogacy as the 
“habitual residence” of the intending parents.
177
 This is based on the intention of all parties 
that the child’s stay in the overseas country is temporary, and for the child to travel to New 
Zealand permanently.
178
 This will only be the case where there is a genetic link between the 
intending parents and the resulting child.
179
  
(a) Critique 
The courts have interpreted the “habitual residence” requirement where possible to avoid the 
application of the Act. This could be considered to stretch the plain words of the statute by 
allowing a child to be deemed a “habitual resident” of a country which it was not born in and 
has never visited. This would not be necessary if the allocation of parentage in surrogacy was 
not subject to the international adoption framework, which, as with adoption in general, was 
not designed with surrogacy in mind.
180
 
F Care of Children Act 2004 
1 Guardianship 
If the above difficulties with adoption pose a barrier to exercising rights and obligations in 
relation to a resulting child, a guardianship order under the Care of Children Act 2004 
(CoCA) may be available.  
Guardianship confers on the guardian responsibilities and rights necessary for the care and 
upbringing of the child,
181
 including the role of providing day-to-day care for the child, and 
determining or helping the child to determine questions about important matters such as 
residence, medical treatment, education, and religious denomination.
182
  
Most parents will become guardians automatically upon birth, and those that do not may 
apply to the court to be appointed.  
Applications for guardianship orders may be made by anybody.
183
 This is mitigated by the 
fact that courts have shown reluctance to appoint multiple guardians, due to the increased risk 
of disagreements over important facets of the child’s upbringing.
184
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If an adoption does not occur in surrogacy: the intending couple or, if the intending father has 
been recorded on the birth certificate, the father’s partner, may apply for a guardianship 
order. This would grant the authority to care for the child on a day to day basis. 
(a) Complications  
Guardianship creates a legal relationship lasting only for the duration of childhood. This 
differs from parenthood, which creates a “life-long link” between parent and child.
185
 
Entitlements under intestacy, family protection, citizenship, and child support laws also flow 
purely from the fact of parenthood, and not guardianship. Therefore, for example, the child 
may miss out on benefits that would have accrued to a legal child.
186
  
Furthermore those who parent the child on a day-to-day basis will likely see “guardianship or 
custody a lesser status than that of legal parenthood”,
187
 and it could be argued that 
guardianship does not give the family “the sense of permanence and connectedness that 
facilitates bonding and attachment.”
188
 The sense of impermanence could be promoted by the 
fact guardianship orders can be revoked at any time.
189
 
Accordingly it is submitted that any framework developed should focus on ensuring the 
facilitation of legal parenthood, as opposed to guardianship. 
VI Inducing Change: Key Themes 
A Identity 
As discussed earlier in the paper, many adoptees subjected to closed arrangements were 
discovered to have a “psychological need” to know the true identity of their biological 
parents.
190
 There is evidence that children conceived with anonymous donor gametes may 
also suffer from genealogical confusion.
191
 
The HART Act 2004 seeks to prevent these outcomes by providing a registry allowing donor-
conceived children access to information about their genetic parents. 
1 Identity and surrogacy  
In surrogacy arrangements, it is unlikely that a resulting child will have no contact with his or 
her surrogate mother. Surrogacy arrangements usually involve a strong relationship of trust 
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between all parties, and an altruistic surrogate may be a relative or close friend. Therefore, 
there is likely to be a continuing personal relationship.
192
  
However, issues surrounding knowledge of identity have the potential to be just as acute.
193
 If 
a resulting child were handed to intending parents immediately after birth, the child may not 
be aware of his or her origins.
194
 
If the resulting child has been adopted, information about the gestational parent will likely be 
available under the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985. Where an adoption has not been 
carried out, the birth mother’s information will remain on the birth certificate and her identity 
therefore known to any resulting child. There is otherwise no record from which the child 
might trace the surrogate mother.  
Although most surrogacies appear to be open, experiences from adoptees and gamete 
donation shows it will be important for a child born of surrogacy to know who gestated them.  
2 Maori perspectives 
Ensuring relevant information about a surrogate mother is available accords with Maori 
values, as in tikanga Maori knowledge of whakapapa and turangawaewae is vital.
195
   
Dr Lynley Anderson has highlighted that “the uptake of surrogacy by [Maori] is lower than 
that predicted by the proportion of Maori within the New Zealand population.”
196
 She 
attributes this in part to the fact ART does not fit within the Maori world view of “[holistic] 
connectivity through whakapapa” which requires transparency about origins.
197
 By promoting 
transparency, more Maori may feel comfortable engaging in surrogacy. This would help 
ensure the needs, values and beliefs of Maori are treated with respect in accordance with 
principle (f) of the HART Act 2004.
198
 
B  Defining Parenthood  
Parenthood is often conceptualised as comprised of three components: a genetic blood-
relationship; gestation; and an intention to have a child.
199
 These components can now be 
divided, begging the question of “the relevance of genetic, gestational and rearing 
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contributions to parenthood, given that each of these contributions can be provided by 
different people”.
200
  
The definition of maternity has created the most difficulties, particularly in cases of 
gestational surrogacy. In traditional surrogacy both genetic and gestational primacy are 
vested in the same woman,
201
 whereas in gestational surrogacy “identification and 
definition of the mother become matters of negotiable choice.”
202
   
There has been reluctance to divorce the title of legal mother from the process of 
gestation. This is reflected in New Zealand’s current allocation of legal motherhood to the 
gestational mother if ART has been used. The bias towards gestation as indicative of 
motherhood is also supported by s 18, which bestows the title of additional legal parent 
based upon the nature of the relationship with the gestational parent. This deference to 
gestation has created perverse results when applied to surrogacy arrangements. Arguably, 
genetics or intention may be more appropriate starting points for defining legal 
motherhood. 
The majority of jurisprudence and commentary surrounding the relevance of contributions 
to parenthood originates from the United States. 
Usually the discussion arises in the context of disputes between intending parents and 
surrogates. No such case has occurred to date in New Zealand. In the United States, no 
uniform approach to balancing the competing claims of parenthood has materialised. In 
fact, “the law often seems to be lurching unwittingly in opposite directions.”
203
 
Whether a dispute has arisen or all parties to the arrangement remain in agreement, 
recognising the role genetics, gestation and intention play in surrogacy arrangements 
provides a basis from which to formulate a coherent policy for the allocation of 
parenthood in surrogacy arrangements.  
1 Genetics 
(a) Intuitive fairness 
In traditional surrogacy both genetics and gestation coincide. In gestational surrogacy the 
genetic connection will be absent. Proponents of genetic pre-eminence find that it is 
“intuitively appropriate to award maternity to the genetic mother [in gestational surrogacy] 
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because the desire for the genetic bond was the catalyst that led the parties to pursue 
surrogacy”.
204
  
However, it cannot be assumed that the intending mother in gestational surrogacy (or the 
intending father’s male partner) is genetically related to the child.
205
 Allowing genetics to 
determine parenthood in gestational surrogacy would have unintended consequences where 
the child is conceived by a intending parent and third party donor.
 206
  It would require the 
primacy of the donor contrary to an abundance of law which states that a donor is not a legal 
parent for any purposes.  
(b) Feminist critique 
Feminist critiques point out that while a man solely contributes genetic material to 
reproduction, women may contribute by providing both genetic material and gestating the 
foetus.
207
 Approaches placing greater significance on the contribution of genetic material 
subjugate the exclusively female experience of pregnancy to the male-biased perspective.
208
  
Two prominent US cases, Belsito v Clark and Johnson v Calvert, have been critiqued for 
placing too much emphasis on genetics and devaluing gestation.
209
 Belsito v Clark referred to 
gestation as a “filtering system”,
210
 “subordinate and secondary” to genetics.
211
 Johnson v 
Calvert described the relevant gestational surrogate as a “genetic hereditary stranger”, and 
analogised the relationship between the gestational surrogate and the child she was carrying 
with that of a foster parent.
 212
 
Anne Goodwin argues that such an approach fails to recognise that the gestational surrogate’s 
role is more akin to co-procreator, than mere “temporary custody”.
213
  
(c) Identity 
At first blush a genetics focused approach appears consistent with increased recognition of 
the importance of genetic heritage. However, Erin Hisano submits that “society can recognise 
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and value the genetic link between a mother and child without making it the decisive factor in 
determining motherhood.”
214
  
(d) Societal construct 
Finally, it appears that “the importance attached to genetic ties is as socially influenced as 
much anything else”.
215
  While genetic connection underlies parenthood laws in natural 
conception,
216
 it has been downplayed in favour of social parenthood in the context of gamete 
donation.
217
 Submissions to the Law Commission showed that in fathers’ groups genetics 
were very important, and considered to elevate a natural father’s status above that of a step-
parent acting as a social parent. Yet these groups also held the view that financial liability 
should be determined by social, not genetic, parenthood.
 218
   
Even within a surrogacy arrangement, if a gestational surrogate is carrying a child for the 
intending parents conceived with the intending father’s sperm and a separate donor’s egg, the 
intending couple will likely be anxious to assert legal parenthood through the father’s genetic 
connection, while disavowing any legal right the egg donor might have in relation to the child 
despite her genetic connection. This highlights the subjectivity of views on this point, and the 
difficulty with treating genetics as the ultimate decider of parentage in surrogacy. 
2 Gestation 
 
(a) Foundation 
New Zealand, as with most legal systems, still bases its laws concerning motherhood in the 
principle of mater semper certa est.
219
 
Despite the fact “IVF [altruistic] surrogacy is at the end of the spectrum which raises fewest 
qualms about commercialisation, exploitation and harm to the participants, including the 
child”,
220
 the motivation for leaving parental rights and responsibilities with the surrogate 
until she consents to an adoption is designed to protect her relationship with the child. 
This emphasis elevates the purported immutable bond formed between surrogate and child, 
during the “lengthy and arduous…process of gestation and childbirth”.
221
 Gestation is 
considered to have emotional and physiological components which can make it difficult to 
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adhere to the pre-conception intent of the parties.
222
 This may be exacerbated in traditional 
surrogacy, where a surrogate mother also has a genetic link to the child that she is carrying.
223
 
Concerns have been raised that to automatically or upon dispute eliminate a gestational 
mother’s parental rights in favour of a genetic or intentional intending parent would devalue 
her role as “co-procreator”.
224
  
(b) Paternalism 
Kirsty Horsey has argued that a focus on protecting the gestational mother is “based on 
assumptions that surrogates are vulnerable, easily exploited and somehow deserve special 
protection.”
225
 She argues that in fact most surrogates feel empowered by their act of 
altruism.
226
  
A comparable argument is that the belief a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree 
to gestate and deliver a baby for another couple is reminiscent of rampant paternalism.
227
 
This view is supported in the New Zealand context by the extensive requirements in clinical 
surrogacy at ECART approval stage ensuring that a surrogate is fully cognisant of the 
implications of the arrangement, and in particular the preference that she have already 
completed her own family. It may be unnecessarily paternalistic to tell a woman who has 
given birth before that she does not understand the impact of pregnancy. 
This argument will not apply with the same force in private surrogacy arrangements, as no 
ethics approval is required.  
(c) Impact of intention 
Kirsty Horsey argues that the supposed immutable bond is merely a social construction 
perpetuating “existing normative constructions” of motherhood.
228
 If the surrogate never 
expects to be recognised as the parent or to raise the child she carries, bonding may not take 
place at all.
229
  
Concern that relinquishment might psychologically harm the gestational mother is largely 
based on studies in the context of adoption about the grief biological mothers experience. 
Surrogacy could be distinguished on the grounds that the decision to surrender parental rights 
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to somebody else is made prior to conception of the child as opposed to afterwards.
230
  
Furthermore if an adoption is not carried out and parental status not conferred, as is common 
in the New Zealand context, it may be the on-going status of legal mother that causes the 
surrogate anxiety (as opposed to any doubt about handing over the resulting child).
231
 
(d) Donor analysis 
The surrogate’s contributions could be conceptualised as a “donation”, and therefore 
analogous to the parental rights (or lack thereof) of gamete donors. The surrogate donates her 
time, energy and bodily resources – and, in traditional surrogacy, her genetic material also.
232
 
This position has been critiqued on the basis that the “commitment and contribution [of a 
surrogate] is unavoidably much greater than that [for example] of a sperm donor.”
233
 The 
New Jersey Family Policy Council, in response to a judicial opinion which sought to 
analogise between surrogacy and gamete donation, protested that gestational mothers “carry 
babies for nine months, experience all the biological risks and bonds of motherhood” whereas 
sperm donors “once got paid to masturbate into a cup.”  
3 Intentional Parenthood  
 
(a) “But for” test 
Champions of intentional parenthood apply a “but for” test, reasoning that intending parents 
orchestrate the existence of the child,
234
 are the prime movers and “originators of the 
concept”,
235
 and therefore but for their actions a child would not exist.
236
 Thus, the intending 
parents should be presumed to be a resulting child’s legal parents.  
This is consistent with the approach to parentage determinations in ordinary gamete donation, 
which allows the intent of the parties to override biological realities. Nonetheless, a “but for” 
test creates its own inherent fallacies. Conception could not also not have been achieved “but 
for” a gamete donation, or the aide of the surrogate. 
The requisite intention would extend beyond conception to active involvement in the child’s 
life.
237
 In the infamous Californian case Johnson v Calvert,
238
 the Calverts created an embryo 
with their genetic material to be carried by a gestational surrogate, Johnson. After the 
relationship deteriorated, the Court declared the intending parents the legal parents of the 
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impending child. The decision was influenced both by genetics and the original intentions of 
the parties: “…she who intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to 
raise as her own – is the natural mother under Californian law.”
239
[Emphasis added] 
Johnson v Calvert used intention as the deciding factor between competing genetic and 
gestational claims to motherhood. This approach could be lauded as according with gender 
neutrality, refraining from subjugating either gestation or genetics to the other.
240
  
The flaw in this approach is that it relies on the assumption that “rational individuals do not 
change their minds after making decisions”.
241
 As noted in the above sections, this fails to 
take into account that “the gestational carrier’s physical and social relationship with the 
potential child dramatically changes as her pregnancy progresses and when she experiences 
childbirth.”
242
   
(b) Certainty 
Allowing legal parenthood to vest in the intending, intended parents without post-birth 
requirements would provide certainty and uniformity.
243
  
In prominent Californian surrogacy case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the Court of Appeals 
emphasised that it is important to choose a primary family for the infant before his or her 
birth.
244
  
In the New Zealand context, identifying intent as the determinate factor – especially pre-birth 
– is difficult due to the legislature’s policy decision not to allow the enforceability of 
surrogacy contracts. It was important to the legislature to allow the gestational mother room 
to assert any rights should she desire to, despite the parties’ initial intent. 
Intent doctrine could be used as a basis for a swift post-birth mechanism allocating legal 
parenthood to the intending parents (in accordance with the parties’ intentions), provided the 
surrogate agrees. Nevertheless, one view tenders that we should be wary of a post-birth 
approach as “even where the surrogate mother is happy to hand over the child at birth, [this] 
approach to parenthood nevertheless demands that the child’s life start with litigation, albeit 
amicable”.
245
  
4 Best interests 
(a) No single rule 
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The above sections display the difficulty encountered in seeking to discern an overriding 
principle determinative of parenthood. Each approach encompasses its own set of flaws, and 
there is no clear justification for ranking one component above all others.
246
  
This is consistent with the view of the Law Commission in the New Issues in Legal 
Parenthood Report (discussed in Part VII) that “no one factor can or should be taken to be 
solely determinative of legal parenthood.”
247
 
Erin Hisano has suggested a shift in focus from the parents to the child, to allow the best 
interests of the child test to inform policy surrounding the allocation of parentage and in 
disputes should the parties no longer agree.
248
 Best interests recognises that a single legal rule 
is insufficient to account for the variety of contexts in which surrogacy occurs.
249
 A broader 
test could incorporate analysis of genetic contribution, gestational bond, and pre-conception 
intent, and the ways in which these connections are relevant to the well-being of the resulting 
child.
250
  
(b) Critique 
Imposing a child welfare test could risk holding the infertile party in a surrogacy agreement 
to a higher standard than both parents who conceive naturally and those conceiving via 
ordinary gamete donation. Neither fertile parents (nor gamete recipients) are required to 
validate their status.
251
 
Additionally, in Johnson v Calvert the Court stated that the best interests of the child test 
should not be used to determine the fact of a child’s legal parentage, but goes to custody once 
parenthood has been established.
252
  
(c) Local context 
The best interests of the child approach would slot in easily to the current New Zealand 
family law framework, which treats the best interests of children as paramount in all child 
welfare decisions. 
The Johnson v Calvert critique may, however, have credence. Legal parenthood in New 
Zealand has historically been treated as a fact, whether due to genetic reality or operation of 
law. Your parentage is generally not determined by who it would be in your best interests to 
parent you, although who provides your day to day care and has contact with you might be.    
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The best interests test has been used in the transfer of parentage in adoption. This is less a 
recognition of an existing fact of parenthood, than a safeguard for the child when recognised 
parents renounce their rights and responsibilities in favour of others.  
It would further be time consuming and ineffective to require the Court to undertake a 
comprehensive best interests analysis in every surrogacy case to determine who the legal 
parents should be.
253
 Those cases with ECART approval will already have “passed” a robust 
screening regime to ensure the arrangement will accord with the interests of all involved. If 
parties remain in agreement, further investigation seems superfluous.  
A best interests approach could inform any new transferral of legal parenthood regime 
specific to surrogacy, if incorporating an element of intent analysis by dispensing with a 
comprehensive interests breakdown where the parties remain in agreement.  
Professor Graeme Austin has argued that a parental status discussion should begin with 
presumptive weight to agreements reached between the parties, while remaining subject to 
the paramountcy principle.
254
 He has submitted that this starting point would be consistent 
with the “practical functional focus” of other aspects of New Zealand family law.
255
  
Building upon his view, if ECART has approved the arrangement, the child is born and the 
parties remain in agreement: it will be in the child’s best interest to have their status 
formalised quickly (and without the contorted reasoning required in the application of the 
Adoption Act 1955). 
In traditional surrogacy, where no ECART approval has been given, if there is no evidence 
the surrogate has been coerced by any means, and all parties remain in agreement post birth, 
the best interests approach could operate in the same way. 
If there were a disagreement, the courts could then approach the question of legal parenthood 
and/or guardianship or co-parenting utilising the all-encompassing best interests analysis 
Hisano favours.  
The above discussions and conclusion will be used to critique the following proposals for 
dealing with declarations of parentage in surrogacy in New Zealand. 
VII Proposals 
A Law Commission: new issues in legal parenthood 
The Law Commission’s New Issues in Legal Parenthood Report recommended that a Part 3 
be inserted into the Status of Children Act 1969, empowering the court to make an interim 
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pre-birth order transferring legal parenthood to the intending parents.
256
 This interim order 
would be confirmed and become final three weeks after birth in the absence of any objection 
filed by the surrogate.
257
 
If no interim pre-birth order was sought, legal parenthood would vest in the surrogate (and 
any existing partner) in accordance with the current provisions of the Status of Children Act 
1969. However, the court would remain able to transfer legal parenthood by court order 
anytime between three weeks and six months after the child is born.
258
 
Requirements for an order would include the following:
259
 
(a) That the surrogate be over 18 years old and already have a child herself; 
(b) The relevant child must be the genetic child of an intending parent; 
(c) Any payment made must only be for reasonable and necessary expenses; 
(d) The parties must have undertaken separate and joint counselling; and 
(e) The agreement must be entered into voluntarily: that is unconditional consent must 
have been given after independent legal advice has been sought. 
If no interim pre-birth order was sought but the parties seek an order from the court post 
birth, the Law Commission added the additional requirement that the “making of the order is 
in the best interests of the child”.
260
  
In relation to genetic identity, the Law Commission considered all parents, whether involved 
in a private or clinical arrangement, should be required to inform the Registrar General of the 
identity of the surrogate mother (in addition to the donor’s identifying information, if a donor 
was used).
261
  
The Commission proposed mandatory participation in an education programme designed to 
impress upon the parties the importance of ensuring the resulting child is aware of the origins 
of his or her birth.
262
 Fertility clinics and counsellors would also be required to develop a 
“best practice” counselling protocol in this regard.
263
 
1 Analysis  
 
(a) Pre-birth order 
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The above approach seeks to ensure “clarity and certainty at the earliest possible time”,
264
 
and gives effect to the intention of the relevant parties (provided this accords with the 
specified requirements). The Commission reasoned that “the planned nature of surrogacy… 
enables the law to set in place a degree of pre-conception and pre-birth certainty.”
265
 
Facially, the pre-birth transfer of legal parentage may conflict with the current policy 
rendering surrogacy arrangements unenforceable. However, the Commission rationalised 
that recognition of parentage in this way was permissible “so long as…separately 
legislated for”,
266
 as opposed to dictated by the terms of a private agreement. In addition, 
by allowing three weeks post birth in which a surrogate may assert her parental rights, the 
mechanism retains protection for the surrogate – a primary motivation for preventing the 
enforceability of surrogacy arrangements. 
The requirement that the pre-birth order merely be confirmed also minimises the concern 
that it is undesirable to begin the child’s life with litigation, “albeit amicable”.
267
 Court 
involvement is kept to a minimum. 
Additionally, by using the terminology parental order, the Law Commission divorces the 
transferral of parentage in surrogacy from adoption. The parental order has significant 
similarities with adoption; notably that the birth mother retains an opportunity to object to the 
arrangement. Nonetheless a parental order is likely to be more acceptable to intending 
parents. Several families interviewed by the Commission had indicated that they had avoided 
adoption due to a personal belief they should not have to adopt their “own” child (a process 
historically reserved for unwanted children, without a genetic connection to their adoptive 
parents).  
(b) Traditional and gestational surrogacy 
The proposal focuses more heavily on intention and gestation than genetics (although due to 
ECART requirements, in all clinical surrogacy arrangements one of the intending parents will 
be genetically related to the resulting child). For example, the Law Commission’s proposal 
does not distinguish between gestational and traditional surrogacy:
268
 
Both arrangements are entered into in society, and neither is unlawful so long as the 
arrangement is not commercial. In these circumstances it seems preferable to provide for both 
in the same way. 
The additional donation of genes therefore does not provide any additional rights that would 
not accrue to a gestational surrogate. The right to object stems from the pregnancy itself.  
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This approach recognises and protects the unique female contribution to reproduction. Yet, 
by providing an easy pre-birth order by which parenthood can be transferred from the 
surrogate, the Commission avoids paternalism by recognising that not all gestating mothers 
will experience an “immutable bond”, and promoting a surrogate’s agency to rationalise and 
bind herself to an agreement. 
(c) Requirements 
The requirements proposed for a parental order are consistent with those expressed in the 
ACART guidelines.  
(d) Identity 
The proposal recognises the importance of knowing one’s genetic identity by requiring the 
registration of surrogate mothers with the Registrar General in the same manner as gamete 
donors. Additionally, mandatory education programmes are proposed, to enhance the 
likelihood parents will advise their children of the full circumstances of their birth, and the 
availability of information in the registry. 
2 Government response  
The then Labour Government agreed that the existing adoption process is not well suited to 
surrogacy arrangements. While the Government considered that “families created by 
surrogacy should not be disadvantaged through a lack of certainty and clarity”, it committed 
only to giving “careful consideration to the design and legal implications.”
269
 
No concrete government proposals were forthcoming. There was a change of Government in 
2008, and the “new” National government has indicated that updating the outdated adoption 
and parentage laws are not a current priority.
270
  
B Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Reform) Amendment Bill 
1 Adoption reform 
Kevin Hague MP of the Green Party has created a Member’s Bill designed to overhaul the 
current “archaic” adoption and surrogacy laws.
271
 The Bill is a “much more ambitious reform 
than is usually attempted through the Members’ bill process”.
272
 The Bill remains in the 
ballot and is yet to be drawn. 
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Mr Hague seeks primarily to enact the proposals contained in the Law Commission’s 
Adoption and Its Alternatives Report released in 2000.
273
 The 2000 Report had proposed that 
adoptions should be dealt with under a new Care of Children Act, to consider the welfare and 
best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. CoCA 2004 was enacted, however 
adoption law was not updated concomitantly.
274
 Accordingly this Bill seeks to repeal the 
Adoption Act 1955 and provide for adoption by inserting a new Part 4 within the Care of 
Children regime, which deals with related issues of day-to-day care, contact and 
guardianship.
275
 The Adoption (Intercountry) Act 1997 would also be repealed, and its 
provisions incorporated into the new statute.
276
 In doing so, the Bill ensures that “all 
arrangements providing for the care of children in New Zealand are found in one statute and 
the law is unified.”
277
 
To this end, the Bill also caters for altruistic surrogacy arrangements, both local and 
international, within the adoption framework.
278
 
2 Surrogacy provisions 
Subpart 3 of the Bill is concerned with surrogacy arrangements. “Permitted” surrogacy 
arrangements are those that fall within the guidelines of, and have been approved by, ECART 
in accordance with the HART Act 2004. Therefore, they cannot be of a commercial nature.
279
  
However, cl 220(2) and (3) provide a comprehensive definition of “reasonable expenses 
incurred” for which the altruistic surrogate may be reimbursed without falling foul of the 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy, or the proposed offence in cl 183 of receiving payment 
in consideration of adoption.  
Clause 222 details when adoption orders shall be made for altruistic surrogacy arrangements. 
Adoption orders in surrogacy will be subject to the ordinary provisions applicable to adoption 
in the Bill.
280
 However, whether or not there is a written surrogacy agreement appears to 
impact upon the available processes. Where a written surrogacy arrangement exists, cl 222(2) 
provides that the parties may agree to begin the pre-adoption assessment process prior to 
birth. Presumably this is desirable as it creates pre-birth certainty. 
Features of this process include an assessment by a CYFS social worker as to the adoptive 
parents’ suitability,
281
 and a written parenting plan discussing how the parties will approach 
contact and provide the child with information about the circumstances of his or her birth in 
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the future.
282
 Some aspects of the pre-adoption process will be unable to be carried out at this 
stage, for example consent of the birth mother, which can only be given 28 days after birth.
283
 
The Bill also emphasises the importance of the child’s consent,
284
 however in an adoption 
giving effect to surrogacy this consent would be dispensed with due to the very young age of 
the child involved.
285
  
It is not clear on the face of cl 222 whether this pre-adoption assessment could also occur pre-
birth in the absence of a written agreement. It may be that the clause seeks to ensure all 
parents engaging in surrogacy formalise the arrangement before seeking to secure legal 
parenthood, by delaying the process if no written agreement is in place. This approach would 
be a significant departure from the current approach taken by fertility clinics to refer all 
prospective parents to CYFS for an assessment prior to conception, let alone birth.
286
  
After the birth of the child, if the applicants have been accepted as suitable to adopt, pending 
the adoption order the commissioning parents may provide day-to-day care for the child. This 
is subject to the consent of the birth mother, and the approval of the social worker or the 
Court on application.
 287
 
(a)  Analysis 
 
There are substantial differences between the Law Commission’s approach to the issue in 
2005 and the approach taken eight years later in the currently proposed Bill.  
 
(i) Framework 
 
New Issues in Legal Parenthood had focused on changes to the Status of Children Act 1969 
as opposed to CoCA. The Law Commission also sought to establish a parental order regime 
entirely separate from adoption, whereas the current proposed Bill seeks to provide for 
surrogacy within a revamped adoption framework. 
 
Providing for surrogacy within CoCA makes sense, given that this statute otherwise governs 
important issues pertaining to the care of children.
288
  
 
The Bill’s proposers’ cite the Law Commission’s 2000 Adoption Report as inspiration. There 
is no reference to the Law Commission’s 2005 comprehensive proposal for transferral of 
parentage in surrogacy. 
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One potential justification for this is that a separate mechanism for the transferral of 
parentage in surrogacy was largely motivated by the awkward application of the Adoption 
Act 1955. If the 1955 legislation is repealed and adoption updated, arguably a separate 
mechanism is no longer required. 
This is supported by the attempts in the Bill to specifically address issues of application in the 
1955 Act, such as the difficult application of s 25. While retaining a prohibition on payments 
in consideration of adoption, the Bill makes it clear that payments of reasonable expenses 
incurred in an altruistic surrogacy arrangement are permissible and will not impede 
adoption.
289
 For the avoidance of doubt, the Bill contains a comprehensive list of payments 
which would fall under “reasonable expenses”.
290
 
(ii) Purpose 
Nonetheless, the new adoption framework does not fully accommodate the unique 
considerations of surrogacy. Despite recognition in the 2000 Act that adoption today has 
many purposes beyond providing for children whose parents cannot care for them, the 
principles and objects of the Bill set out in cl 165 state that:
291
 
[a]doption is to be regarded as a service for the child in order to provide that child with 
permanent legal parents where that child’s parents, family or whanau are not able to care for the 
child. 
This does not encompass the motivations behind surrogacy arrangements. Additionally, this 
perpetuates the connotations attached to the term adoption that have prevented intending 
parents from formalising their roles in the past. For the average New Zealander, the term 
adoption will have the same implications whether contained in an Adoption or a Care of 
Children Act.  
(iii) Requirements 
Despite the provisions specific to altruistic surrogacy, intending parents are subject to the 
same adoption conditions as those without genetic connection who have not “orchestrated” 
the child’s conception. Intending parents must still be assessed as to their suitability to parent. 
This places infertile couples at a substantial disadvantage to those who conceive genetic 
children without ARTs, whose suitability to parent is not assessed.  
A comprehensive assessment at this stage is perhaps less appropriate where the parents have 
already undergone a robust investigation into the arrangement by ECART. If ECART has 
already approved the circumstances prior to conception, it makes little sense to impose 
further assessments of suitability after the fact.  
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(iv) ECART approval 
Problematically, where ECART approval has not been given, it appears that no adoption 
order can be made under the provisions applicable to altruistic surrogacy. Sub-clause 
220(1)(d) holds that for an altruistic arrangement to be permitted, the proposed arrangement 
must fall within the guidelines of and have been approved by ECART.  
As the ECART guidelines currently govern clinical surrogacy, the above provision appears to 
exclude private surrogacies. As a private surrogacy would not qualify as a permitted 
“altruistic surrogacy arrangement” under the Bill, ostensibly the altruistic surrogacy 
provisions relating to adoption would not apply. It is unclear the effect this would have on 
private surrogacies, and whether the intending parents could simply apply for adoption in the 
normal fashion given that adoption in surrogacy appears to be for the most part subject to the 
same provisions.  
It is unclear why the Bill would exclude private surrogacies from the surrogacy provisions, as 
provided they are altruistic, they remain legal under the HART Act 2004. If the approach was 
to ensure that the arrangement had been carried out ethically, this could be achieved by 
rephrasing the relevant sub-clause to read “falling within the guidelines of or have been 
approved by [ECART]”. This would ensure that private surrogacies were included, and the 
status of children resulting from private arrangements were provided for, but also that these 
arrangements were carried out in accordance with recognised ethical principles. 
(v) Identity 
The Bill ensures that adoptions will be open unless this conflicts with the welfare and best 
interests of the child. This is ensured by a required written parenting plan, which sets out the 
parties’ intentions regarding contact and proposed arrangements as to informing the child of 
the origins of his or her birth.
 292
  
This process is also required in surrogacy adoptions.
293
 While the ECART process already 
requires that parties undertake a discussion of this nature, the formal organisation of a written 
parenting plan will consolidate the approach to informing the resulting child about his or her 
background. Parenting plans could be particularly helpful in surrogacy arrangements which 
did not go through the ECART approval process.  
3 International Surrogacy  
 
(a) Adoption in New Zealand 
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The Bill also includes a provision which dictates when an adoption could be granted in New 
Zealand for a child born via international surrogacy. The Bill makes it clear an adoption 
would only be granted if the international arrangement was altruistic in nature.
294
 
 
Intending parents could apply for leave to commence a pre-adoption assessment process in a 
New Zealand Court in respect of a child born of altruistic surrogacy overseas.
295
 To do so, the 
parents would have to be parties to a written altruistic surrogacy arrangement; the 
arrangement would have to be lawful in the country where the surrogacy was to occur; and 
the arrangement could not be repugnant to the purposes and principles of the newly amended 
CoCA, HART Act 2004, or any guidelines set down by ECART or ACART.
296
  
 
(b) Status of Children Act amendments 
 
A number of proposed amendments to the Status of Children Act 1969 are also included. 
These would protect the status of children born via surrogacy elsewhere, if the country of 
birth has legally recognised the relationship between the child and the intending parents.  
 
Section 5 would be amended to include the presumption that if a child is born in a foreign 
country, and parents are named on the child’s birth certificate or a court order allocating 
parentage, this will be prima facie evidence that the named persons are the legal parents of 
the child in New Zealand.  This appears to be the case regardless of whether that relationship 
would have been recognised locally under the Status of Children Act 1969.
297
 
 
(c) Analysis 
 
This approach seeks to facilitate international surrogacies, provided that they are consistent 
with both the laws of New Zealand and of the country in which the surrogacy occurs. The 
inherent difficulty however is that, as evidenced by international surrogacy adoptions in the 
New Zealand courts; international surrogacies are not often altruistic.  Couples may head 
overseas to a country in which women are willing to act as surrogates for compensation, as a 
result of an inability to find a willing altruistic surrogate locally. 
 
The Bill does seek to strike a balance with the amendments to the Status of Children Act 
1969. Parents that engage in commercial surrogacies overseas and have their parentage 
recognised in that jurisdiction would be presumed to be the legal parents in New Zealand, 
despite not having adopted the children.  
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This would remedy the illogical situation faced by the previously mentioned Rees Rear and 
Brett Ramsey, who could not obtain citizenship by descent for their children without adoption 
despite being listed on their birth certificates as the legal parents. It could also have the effect 
of ensuring New Zealanders pursue commercial surrogacy only in countries willing to 
recognise their legal parentage. This would ensure New Zealand courts would not be forced 
to effectively ratify commercial arrangements inconsistent with local policy. 
 
This hands-off approach to commercial arrangements is a significant departure from the 
previous position shared by most Commonwealth courts.
298
 The tendency has been to focus 
primarily on the welfare of the child, in effect ignoring normal legal requirements “in order to 
ensure that a child grows up in a safe and stable home and has a right to citizenship.”
299
 This 
approach was evidenced in the earlier mentioned case of Re SCR. The Court was willing to 
accept that the New Zealand intending parents had not made a commercial payment to the 
surrogate, as the element of the money beyond reimbursement was paid by the resulting 
child’s grandfather, an American citizen. 
 
An earlier draft of the proposed Bill contained a provision which provided that an 
international commercial surrogacy arrangement would not of itself prevent an adoption 
application from being lodged, or compel the Court to refuse to grant an order. The provision 
was included “to avoid doubt” that the welfare and the best interests of the child would be the 
paramount consideration.
 300
 
 
Professor Mark Henaghan has expressed disappointment that this provision was removed, 
and argued that any new surrogacy legislation needs to address what happens to the status of 
the resulting child:
301
 
 
Not to recognise the parentage and/or citizenship of children born via international surrogacy is 
to leave these children in legal limbo and to disconnect them from their commissioning parents 
who seek to have, love and nurture these children. 
 
VIII Recommendations 
The Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Reform) Amendment Bill is yet to be 
drawn from the ballot, but provides the best contemporary opportunity to give the outdated 
law a much needed facelift. However, the author submits that the proposed Bill could benefit 
by incorporating elements of the 2005 recommendations. 
A Parental Orders 
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It is desirable to include the mechanisms for the transferral of parentage within CoCA, to 
ensure that all arrangements concerning the care of children are found in one piece of unified 
legislation. However, the amendments should distinguish between adoption and the 
transferral of parentage in surrogacy. The surrogacy transferral mechanism could be referred 
to as a “parental order”. 
This is in recognition of the incompatibility of surrogacy with the understood purposes of 
adoption. The connotations attached to adoption could prevent intending families from 
seeking to formalise their relationship with a resulting child.  
This would also differentiate between parental transfer requiring CYFS approval (adoption), 
and that which does not. Provided the altruistic surrogacy arrangement otherwise meets the 
requirements attached to pre-birth orders, intending parents should not have to be separately 
assessed for their suitability to parent. If there is a genetic connection between an intending 
parent and the resulting child, the couple should not be subjected to assessments not required 
of their fertile counterparts, or other couples experiencing infertility who are able to conceive 
via gamete donation. 
B Pre-birth Orders 
In addition, the author prefers a hybrid approach to the relevant order itself. The interim pre-
birth order proposed in the Law Commission’s 2005 Report provides greater pre-birth 
certainty than the mere allowance to begin pursuing adoption at an earlier stage afforded by 
the Bill. A pre-birth order still protects the surrogate by allowing her to assert her rights as 
gestational parent before the order is finalised post-birth.  
The surrogacy mechanism could retain several of the requirements proposed by the Bill. For 
example, the requirements attached to a pre-birth order (or post-birth order granted between 
three weeks and six months after birth) could be updated to read that an order will be granted 
where the arrangement falls within the guidelines of, or has been approved by ECART, and 
the surrogacy is in accordance with the HART Act 2004. This incorporates both clinical and 
private surrogacies, and would also ensure that the surrogacy provisions only apply where 
there is a genetic connection between an intending parent and the child.  
It is of concern that ECART approval is not currently given to same-sex or single males, and 
therefore that this approach could risk discrimination. For this approach to be inclusive of all 
prospective parents, as envisaged by the proposed Bill, the ECART guidelines must be 
changed in this regard.  
Additionally, the issuance of a pre-birth order should be contingent upon the Court’s approval 
of a written parenting plan, as proposed by the Bill. This is a welcome and innovative pre-
emptive mechanism to promote open relationships and ensure the parties have considered 
how they wish to broach the child’s circumstances of birth with the child.  
 48 
As surrogacy generally involves the use of ARTs, the author considers that the 2005 proposal 
that information regarding the gestational mother be recorded with the central registry, as 
with genetic parents, should also be retained. This would ensure that the provisions relating to 
surrogacy accord with not only the knowledge of identity requirements of adoption, but also 
gamete donation. As surrogacy may also involve third party gamete donation, it would be 
useful for a resulting child to be able to locate all of this information in one place. 
To ensure a degree of coherence between the Bill’s proposed adoption laws and surrogacy, 
the period in which a gestational mother may assert her rights post birth should be extended 
from 21 to 28 days. 
C Disagreement 
In both proposals, legal parenthood would remain vested in the surrogate mother should she 
refuse to either consent to an adoption or object to the issue of a final parental order. As 
suggested by the Law Commission in 2005, if the agreement breaks down a court process 
could resolve the dispute and determine parenthood, day-to-day care and contact with the 
child in accordance with the child’s best interests.
302
 This could all be undertaken under the 
umbrella of CoCA. 
D International Surrogacy 
The issues surrounding international surrogacy are complex, and deserve more analysis than 
can be provided in this paper.
303
  
The focus on altruistic arrangements in the Bill is understandable. It is difficult to see how a 
New Zealand court could grant legal parenthood in a commercial surrogacy situation without 
undermining New Zealand’s prohibition on commercial arrangements.  
The proposed amendment to the Status of Children Act 1969 strikes a tentative balance 
between parental recognition and local policy by letting legal parentage achieved through a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement lie provided the recognition of that legal parentage was 
provided elsewhere. 
However, as pointed out by Mark Henaghan, international commercial surrogacy will 
continue to be prevalent. It cannot be guaranteed New Zealanders will undertake these 
arrangements in countries which will recognise their legal parenthood. Preventing recognition 
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of these caregivers as legal parents may undermine the aim of the Bill to provide for the 
welfare and best interests of resulting children. 
Accordingly it is suggested that the previously removed section regarding adoption in 
international commercial surrogacy should be reintroduced to err on the side of child welfare. 
If the Bill is drawn, this provision would be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament and a Select 
Committee process with the ability to consider the vast policy considerations engaged by the 
section, and balance the competing interests appropriately. 
IX Conclusion 
Surrogacy has posed unique challenges to New Zealand’s outdated legal parenthood laws. 
The courts have “stepped into the gap that Parliament and the government, by failing to bring 
the law up-to-date, have left”,
 304
 in order to provide for the welfare and best interests of 
children resulting from surrogacy. 
The Care of Children (Adoption and Surrogacy Law Reform) Amendment Bill is now poised 
within the ballot. This provides an opportunity for Parliamentarians to formulate a clear legal 
framework designed specifically for the transferral of parentage in surrogacy arrangements. 
The framework recommended by this paper is predicated on giving effect to the intentions of 
the parties to the arrangement, while ensuring the interests of the surrogate are protected and 
that arrangements are carried out in accordance with recognised ethical principles. The 
interests of resulting children in knowing their genetic and biological backgrounds are also 
sharply in focus.  
This approach is built on the assumption that the welfare and best interests of a child is 
promoted by formalising their status in relation to their intended parent as efficiently as 
possible. This ensures the intended parent engages with their responsibilities to the child, and 
the protective aspects of legal parenthood are secured. 
The implications of recognition of parentage in commercial international surrogacy need to 
be further considered by the legislature. In any event, it should be presumed that a 
determination of legal parentage in the jurisdiction in which the commercial surrogacy 
arrangement occurred will evidence legal parentage in New Zealand law. This furthers the 
foundational assumptions of the proposed framework, without undermining the legislative 
policy of the HART Act 2004. 
In summary, despite the passage of time, the conclusion to the issues engaged by legal 
parentage in surrogacy is the same as that reached back in 1987 regarding gamete donation: 
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“It would be wrong for Parliament to deny … defenceless children the rights enjoyed by 
other children who are conceived by more orthodox or traditional means.”
305
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
305 (2 April 1987) 479 NZPD 8274. 
 51 
X Appendix 1: Relevant Statutory Provisions 
A Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 
4 Principles 
All persons exercising powers or performing functions under this Act must be guided by each 
of the following principles that is relevant to the particular power or function: 
(a)  the health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of an 
assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an 
important consideration in all decisions about that procedure: 
(b)  the human health, safety, and dignity of present and future generations should be 
preserved and promoted: 
(c)  while all persons are affected by assisted reproductive procedures and established 
procedures, women, more than men, are directly and significantly affected by 
their application, and the health and well-being of women must be protected in 
the use of these procedures: 
(d)  no assisted reproductive procedure should be performed on an individual and no 
human reproductive research should be conducted on an individual unless the 
individual has made an informed choice and given informed consent: 
(e)  donor offspring should be made aware of their genetic origins and be able to 
access information about those origins: 
(f)  the needs, values, and beliefs of Māori should be considered and treated with 
respect: 
(g)  the different ethical, spiritual, and cultural perspectives in society should be 
considered and treated with respect. 
B Status of Children Act 1969 
5 Presumptions as to parenthood 
(1)  A child born to a woman during her marriage, or within 10 months after the 
marriage has been dissolved by death or otherwise, shall, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be the child of its mother and her 
husband, or former husband, as the case may be. 
(2)  Every question of fact that arises in applying subsection (1) shall be decided on a 
balance of probabilities. 
(3)  This section shall apply in respect of every child, whether born before or after the 
commencement of this Act, and whether born in New Zealand or not, and 
whether or not his father or mother has ever been domiciled in New Zealand. 
17 Woman who becomes pregnant is mother even though ovum is donated by another 
woman 
(1)  This section applies to the following situation: 
(a)  a woman (woman A) becomes pregnant as a result of an AHR procedure: 
(b)  the ovum or embryo used for the procedure was produced by or derived 
from an ovum produced by another woman (woman B). 
(2)  In that situation, woman A is, for all purposes, the mother of any child of the 
pregnancy. 
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18 When woman's non-donor partner is parent, and non-partner semen donor or ovum 
donor is not parent 
(1)  This section applies to the following situation: 
(a)  a partnered woman (woman A) becomes pregnant as a result of an AHR 
procedure: 
(b)  the semen (or part of the semen) used for the procedure was produced by 
a man who is not woman A's partner or, as the case requires, the ovum or 
embryo used for the procedure was produced by, or derived from an 
ovum produced by, a woman who is not woman A's partner: 
(c)  woman A has undergone the procedure with her partner's consent. 
(2)  In that situation, woman A's partner is, for all purposes, a parent of any child of 
the pregnancy. 
26 Conflicting evidence of paternity 
Sections 18, 21 and 22 have effect despite— 
(a)  any conflicting evidence under section 8 that the man who produced the semen 
was the father of the child of the pregnancy: 
(b)  any conflicting declaration of paternity made under section 10 that the man who 
produced the semen was the father of the child of the pregnancy: 
(c)  any other evidence that the man who produced the semen was the father of the 
child of the pregnancy. 
C  Adoption Act 1955 
6 Restrictions on placing or keeping a child in a home for adoption 
(1)  It shall not be lawful for any person to place or receive or keep any child under 
the age of 15 years in the home of any person for the purpose of adoption, 
unless— 
(a)  prior approval has been given by a social worker, and that approval is for 
the time being in force; or 
(b)  an interim order in respect of the proposed adoption is for the time being 
in force. 
(2)  Any approval granted by a social worker for the purposes of this section shall 
remain in force for 1 month after it is granted: 
provided that, where application to the court for an adoption order is made before the 
expiration of 1 month from the date of the grant of the approval, the approval shall 
remain in force until the application is abandoned or dismissed or an order is made by 
the court on the application. 
(3)  An interim order may be made by the court in respect of a child notwithstanding 
that a social worker has refused to grant an approval under this section. 
(4)  This section shall not apply in any case where— 
(a)  the child is in the home pursuant to any provision of the Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1989 or to an order made pursuant to that 
Act; or 
(b)  the child is in the home pursuant to an order made pursuant to the Care of 
Children Act 2004; or 
(c)  the child is in the home of one of the child's parents and a step-parent of 
the child; or 
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(d)  the child is in the home of a relative of the child (not being a relative 
who, in the absence of special circumstances, is prohibited, by reason of 
age or sex, from adopting the child). 
11 Restrictions on making of orders in respect of adoption 
Before making any interim order or adoption order in respect of any child, the court shall be 
satisfied— 
(a)  that every person who is applying for the order is a fit and proper person to have 
the role of providing day-to-day care for the child and of sufficient ability to 
bring up, maintain, and educate the child; and 
(b)  that the welfare and interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, due 
consideration being for this purpose given to the wishes of the child, having 
regard to the age and understanding of the child; and 
(c)  that any condition imposed by any parent or guardian of the child with respect to 
the religious denomination and practice of the applicants or any applicant or as to 
the religious denomination in which the applicants or applicant intend to bring up 
the child is being complied with. 
25 Prohibition of payments in consideration of adoption 
(1)  Except with the consent of the court, it shall not be lawful for any person to give or 
receive or agree to give or receive any payment or reward in consideration of the 
adoption or proposed adoption of a child or in consideration of the making of 
arrangements for an adoption or proposed adoption: 
(1A)  Subsection (1) does not apply to the payment of the hospital and medical 
expenses of the confinement of the mother of a child if— 
(a) the expenses are incurred by virtue of the provision by a society or body 
of persons of hospital care (within the meaning of the Health and 
Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001) and 
(b)  the payment is made by an applicant for an adoption order in respect of 
the child directly to the society or body; and 
(c)  the amount paid has been approved in the particular instance, or is in 
accordance with a scale approved generally, by the chief executive of the 
department of State responsible for the administration of the Health and 
Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to the payment of reasonable costs and expenses to 
any organisation approved as a New Zealand accredited body under Part 2 of the 
Adoption (Intercountry) Act 1997, provided those costs and expenses— 
(a)  are in connection with the exercise of a function delegated to that body 
under Part 1 of that Act; and 
(b)  are set out in an invoice or statement of account rendered by that body 
which sets out details of the costs and expenses, and the services or 
functions to which they apply. 
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